1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

232. As to the first point, specifically about the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna.

It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence, but for my purpose [n.230] let three modes be sufficient. For something other than God -to wit an intelligence other than the first - can be posited in being, or be immutable and necessary, in three ways:Note by Scotus: “Here Henry’s opinion, Quodlibet VIII question 9, is badly held.” The Vatican editors are puzzled as to what Scotus means here, since Henry’s opinion, they say, does not seem to be in any way a distortion. ⁹¹ in one way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence but is from another causally; in a second way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence and is dependent on another, such that, because of essential order, it would be a contradiction for the second to be without the first but not vice versa, and likewise for the third to be without the second but not vice versa, - and this order is between the more perfect and the less perfect [supply: as with figures and numbers [n.245]], but not between cause and caused; in the third way, that something have formally of itself possible existence and have from another also necessary existence, namely because this other causes necessarily.

233. Of these three ways the first way involves a contradiction, as they say [sc. Henry and his followers], and therefore the Philosopher did not posit it, because it does not seem likely that he posited contradictories; that it involves a contradiction is plain, because what is caused by another is of itself a non-being and is of itself a possible being (otherwise it would be impossible for it to be caused), but what is a necessary existent is in no way a possible existent; therefore it is discordant to say that Aristotle posited this way about the separate substances, because of the contradiction involved.

234. That he also denied the third way is proved by the fact it too involves a contradiction.

235. There is a confirmation also of this, because the Commentator in Metaphysics XII com.41 (in the question of John the Grammarian) means that since motion is of itself possible it can be made perpetual by another, because it has being from another - but a possible substance cannot be made perpetual; therefore a perpetual substance cannot be from another.

236. Again, as the Commentator says in On the Heavens I com.138, about Aristotle’s remark ‘It is impossible that the non-generable fall under corruption’; expounding this, the Commentator says that “if some eternal generable thing were found to exist, it would be possible that something possible, or some possible nature, should be changed into something necessary.”

237. Further, it is imputed [by Henry] to the Philosopher that he wished there (On the Heavens, ibid.) that any substance have its existence from its nature - this one always, that one sometime - so that this one necessarily always is, that one necessarily sometime is not; nor could it be otherwise unless one nature were to change into another, or two contrary natures be at the same time in the same thing - as in the same book of On the Heavens both Aristotle and the Commentator conclude.

238. Again, from these places - namely On the Heavens I and Metaphysics XII [235-236] - [Henry] shows that [Aristotle] denied the first way above [n.232], because to every necessary substance is attributed the being of its intrinsic nature, and thus that he posited no perpetual caused thing save what is moved in the heavens (and, by its mediation, individuals which are not necessary, although their species are necessary), but that generable and corruptible things come to be; and from the fact that he posited some order among them, it is concluded [by Henry] that this is in accord with the second way [n.232]. But the species in incorruptible things he said were necessarily in one individual, while the species in corruptible things he said were necessarily in several and diverse individuals, so that the species are of themselves necessary, although corruptible per accidens, just as he posited that the elements were in their totality incorruptible but in their parts corruptible.

239. Against this opinion, which imputes these things to Aristotle, an argument is given first [by Scotus himself] that he did not deny the first way.

This is seen from his intention in Metaphysics 2.1.993b28-31: “Of eternal things the principles must be the truest,” because they are the cause of truth for the other things, - “but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth;” now it is clear, according to him, that everything eternal is necessary, from On the Heavens 1.12.283b1-6 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050b6-8. Again, Metaphysics 5.4.1015b6-11, nothing prevents there being other causes for certain necessary things [e.g. premises causing the conclusions of syllogisms]. If, however, a possibility repugnant to necessity were of the idea of a caused thing (as the said opinion [of Henry] argues [nn.233, 235-236]), it would be a contradiction for any necessary thing to have a cause.

240. Again, Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-23, he deduces the oneness of the universe from the oneness of the end, -     therefore everything other than the end is for it as for the end; but of whatever there is a final cause, there is also an efficient cause; therefore etc     .

Proof of the final consequence: an end is not a cause save insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act and to give being. It moves, he says, as loved and desired (this is plain from the idea of end Metaphysics 5.2.1013b25-27), for which end the agent acts, for which end - namely the end loved - the agent gives being to another thing that is ordered to itself.

241. Again, the Commentator Metaphysics XII com.37 concedes that there is there [in the heavens] cause and caused ‘as the intellect is the cause of intellection’, and Aristotle says that [the first mover] moves as loved and desired. ‘Bath’ as it is in the mind moves as efficient cause, according to the Commentator; at any rate the object moves, as efficient cause, to an act of understanding; therefore also to existence, because [Henry] imputes to the philosopher that he posited each of those substances to be its own act of understanding.

242. Again, Avicenna [Metaphysics IX ch.4 (104vb)] expressly posits that the necessary ‘is from another causally’.     Therefore if in this he saw no contradiction, why should it be denied of Aristotle, because of the contradiction that you [Henry] posit there [n.233]?

243. Again, the Commentator in On the Substance of the Globe ch.2 says: “The celestial body does not only need a virtue moving it in place, but also a virtue bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence, etc     .;” and later: “of the opinion of Aristotle some said that he does not assert a cause activating the whole, but only a moving cause, and that was very absurd.”

244. To these points they [Henry and his followers] reply that “those who posit a false foundation on the basis of probable reasons, end up after a while contradicting themselves on the basis of true reasons.”

On the contrary: you [Henry] have shown [n.233] that Aristotle denies the first way ‘because it seems to involve a contradiction’, and now you concede that he himself contradicts himself;That is, Aristotle does not merely, on probable grounds, assert a first thing from which a contradiction then follows [n.233], but directly contradicts that first thing, by later, on true grounds [n.244], asserting the opposite of it. ⁹² but it seems more reasonable not to impute contradictories to him, but to say that he speaks consistent to a false antecedent when he concedes the consequent.

245. Again, that Aristotle did not posit the second way, which you impute to him [n.238], is seen from the irrationality of this way; proof: for nothing depends for its existence on another thing from which it does not get being, and so neither does it depend for its permanence on another thing from which it does not get permanence, because it gets being and permanence from the same thing. - Nor is the case of figures and numbers similar [n.232], because although there the prior is not the efficient cause of the posterior, it is yet the material cause, as a part is - by potency - in the whole; but in the proposed case no causality can be posited but that of the efficient and final cause, according to Aristotle [n.240].

246. Also, what is imputed to Aristotle about the necessity of the species in corruptible things ‘in diverse individuals’ [n.238] is not true unless he understood it of the necessity of the motion of the heaven, and so of the production of individuals when there is such and such closeness or proportion of the agent to the patient; but necessity is a condition of existence; it does not then belong to species save in individuals. Nor is the case of the element ‘as a whole and in its parts’ similar [n.238], for the element as a whole is a singular, existent of itself, and a principal part of the universe.Text cancelled by Scotus: “That it is also imputed to Aristotle that no substance is from another seems manifestly false in the case of generable things. For generation is into substance; therefore by very generation a thing which before was not receives being, and generation is the efficient cause of what is produced; but nothing produces itself into existence.” ⁹³

247. Again, if what is ‘corruptible’ from its intrinsic cause sometime necessarily is not, as is imputed to him [by Henry to Aristotle, n.237], then it will be corrupted by itself without an external thing corrupting it.

248. The third way [n.232] is also imputed to Avicenna, and a proof is taken from Metaphysics VI ch.2 (92ra), where he says that “a caused thing, as to itself, is that it not be, but, as to its cause, that it be; but what is of itself - as it is in the intellect - is prior [sc. in nature], not in duration, to what is of another,” and this “among the wise is called ‘creation’, to give existence to a thing after absolute non-existence.”

249. Against him it is argued [by Henry] that that way [n.248] involves a contradiction, because if the possible is posited not to be, it follows that it is not only false but also impossible - according to the Philosopher - namely that the cause does not necessarily cause and give being [the opposite of which is posited by Avicenna, nn.248, 242].